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Introduction
On May 14, 1948 David Ben Gurrion declared the independence of the state of
Israel. This event forever changed the climate of the Middle East. Today, the conflict
born 64 years ago between Israel and Palestine continues on. Since 1948, the conflict has
evolved to become extremely complex, encompassing all aspects of Israeli and
Palestinian life. Throughout the years the conflict between the two groups has taken on
many shapes. From terrorist attacks to failed peace negotiations the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict has been the setting for one of the most well-known and controversial battles of
the modern world.
In the last decade, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has seen a new obstacle arise in
the form of the Israeli Security Barrier, which is being constructed between the state of
Israel and the West Bank. The Israeli security barrier was created in 2002 as a response to
security threats from the Palestinian entity. Since creation, the barrier has played an
incredibly important role in the conflict. It has become a major focus of the Israeli
government, the Palestinian population and the international community at large. This
paper will investigate the specifics of the Israeli Security Barrier and provide a more
profound understanding of this simplistic concrete structure.
The first chapter of this paper will provide information about the security barrier
as well as present the major debates that already surround this topic. Furthermore, the
first chapter will look at other defense systems that have existed throughout history. This
will allow for the establishment of historical relevance as well as comparison throughout
the paper. The second chapter of this paper will examine the offensive and defensive
nature of the barrier by investigating the debates surrounding the offense-defense theory.
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After presenting a concise overview of the current debates of scholars like George
Quester and Stephen Biddle, this chapter will attempt to determine whether the barrier is
more of an offensive or defensive entity. This chapter will also discuss deterrence and
provide a formulated argument against the idea of the wall as a deterrent. The third
chapter of this paper will question whether or not the Israeli Security Barrier is actually
about security. Using arguments from strategic barrier experts like Brent L. Sterling, this
chapter will look at evidence to support the claim that the barrier is more about borders
than it is actually about security. Finally, the conclusion chapter will discuss the future
implications of the wall on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as well as the entire
conflict.
Developing out of an actual visit to the Israeli security barrier, the topic for this
paper will provide insight into one of the most controversial pieces of the conflict to date.
The chapters will establish and develop arguments that have not been heavily researched
by scholars in the international community. Furthermore, the investigation of the Israeli
security barrier presented in this paper will allow for a deeper understanding of the
complexity of the current atmosphere surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to dissect one of the major issues facing the IsraeliPalestinian conflict today while providing insight about the reality in the Middle East.
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Chapter I: Literature Review
Israel currently has two security barriers. The first barrier was erected along the
border separating Israel from the Gaza strip. It was completed in 1995 and since that
time has been nearly 100 percent effective in preventing terrorists from entering Israel
from the Gaza Strip (Lochery 24). This fence has not been particularly controversial
because it is located on the border and does not involve the “taking” of Palestinian land.
Furthermore, the border between Israel and Gaza is settled, since Israel has renounced all
claims to the land in Gaza and there is no disputed territory nor do any Israeli settlements
exist in the Gaza strip.
The second wall, which will eventually divide Israel from the entire West Bank,
has become much more disputed and contested. In June 2002, the Israeli’s Defense
Minister at the time, Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, cut the ribbon on the first phase of the West
Bank Wall near the Israeli village of Salem (Dolphin 6). Over the next three years, the
wall headed south through the West Bank, surrounding Jewish settlements on or near the
Green Line.1 The wall then cut an arc around the north, east, and south of Palestinian East
Jerusalem and eventually rejoined the Green Line west of Bethlehem.
Once completed, the length of the route will be approximately 500 miles in total.
As of late 2010, fifty-seven per cent of the construction had already been completed
while nine per cent was under construction and thirty-four per cent had been carefully
planned. According to numerous maps and sources, fourteen per cent of the total planned
route of the barrier runs along the green line and eighty-six per cent is located beyond the
green line (Makovsky 1). The barrier creates a situation in which all inhabitants of the
West Bank will be cut off from East Jerusalem.
1

Green Line: The armistice border established in 1949 at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war.
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Israeli citizens face a severe security threat. Many argue that the wall was built as
a response to the major security threat of the second, or al Aqsa, intifada, which was the
Palestinian’s second national revolt in less than a decade. Unlike the first intifada (19871993), the second wave of violence that erupted in September 2000 was not a popular
uprising; instead it was a coordinated campaign by members of Hamas, the Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the al-Aqsa
Martyrs’ Brigade aimed at bringing down the Israeli government (Palti 1). Suicide
attacks took place on buses or in shopping malls, restaurants, and hotels. The majority
killed by these attacks were civilians, including women and children. According to the
Israel Defense Force (IDF), during the three-year period of the most recent or second
Intifada, there were 53 “successful” suicide infiltrations, which killed 472 Israeli citizens;
another 70 suicide terrorists infiltrated Israel but were stopped before reaching their
targets (Palti 2). The vast majority of these attacks were staged, planned and executed
from the West Bank.
Due to the increase in suicide attacks coupled with the loss of innocent lives, the
Israeli government was under considerable public pressure to present a workable solution
to the security issue. While many of the Israeli Defense Force and Israeli government
operations against West Bank terrorist cells are often interpreted to be collective
punishment of Palestinians, Israel has a duty to protect its population and ensure its
territorial integrity. Thus, basic steps such as checkpoints and roadblocks, in addition to
more involved actions such as “Operation Defensive Shield”, are necessary. These
responses to terrorism were not intended to express Israeli sentiment against the
Palestinian people, only against the Palestinian terrorists (Cypel 152). Although these
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strategies proved to be somewhat effective, infiltration by suicide bombers were still
occurring.
The solution became the Israeli Security Barrier. This plan has proven effective
before in Israel’s other border areas. Other fences follow the Israeli-Lebanese border, the
Golan Heights area and circle the Gaza Strip. The Gaza fence is particularly effective; it
is actually a security “system,” consisting of a dirt road, followed by a portion of fence,
then another road for patrols. It has not allowed a single successful suicide bomber to
infiltrate Israel (Elizur 108). This phenomenon provided the Israeli Government with
concrete evidence and confidence regarding the potential effectiveness of constructing
another security wall with the goal of combating terrorism. The evidence and statistics
that have been produced since the establishment of many sections of the wall are
impressive.
While the first stage of the wall was under construction between October 2000
and July 2003, 35 “successful” suicide attacks originated from the northern West Bank
alone. However, in the first year after the completion of the first stage, only 3 successful
suicide attacks have originated from the northern West Bank (Palti 2). In 2004, the Israel
Defense Force successfully foiled every suicide bomb attack attempt from the northern
West Bank. It is believed that the new barrier has forced terrorists to travel many
kilometers to circumvent the fence. This lengthy trip has given the Israel Defense Forces
as well as Israeli intelligence more time to locate infiltrators and foil their plans.
An example of the success of the security barrier came in June of 2004, when a
terrorist group was exposed by the IDF. The IDF, in conjunction with Israeli
intelligence, discovered that Hezbollah was sponsoring and guiding a terrorist group,
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headed by a man named Halil Araisha. Araisha had a long history of involvement with
terrorist organizations and was recruiting young men to participate in suicide bombings.
One such person was Mahand Karini from a refugee camp in Nablus, a city in the West
Bank. The security fence posed a new problem for the exportation of suicide bombers
from Nablus to Israel and thus forced the terrorist group to move. Karini was instructed
to move a twenty-five kilogram bomb to another village. The IDF became suspicious of
this movement and was able to discover the terrorist organization and defuse the bomb.
The mobilization of terrorists with bombs over long routes has given the IDF more time
to discover attacks and foil them before it is too late (Palti 3-4).
The security zone serves as an obstacle to both vehicles and people. Although the
Palestinians may not wish to admit it, one of the effects of the fence is to limit Israel’s
vulnerability to suicide attacks. The fence is only one part of a broader strategy that has
succeeded in lowering the threshold of violence. Interestingly enough, a poll of
Palestinian attitudes taken by the Jerusalem Media and Communications center suggests
that 36.4 per cent of Palestinians believe that the fence is effective in diminishing attacks
(Fernon 6).
Although the territory of the West Bank is very complicated, not only because of
the large distance covered but also because of the separated Palestinian populations, the
building of a security fence will essentially accomplish the same goal that the other
fences have: providing more security and diminishing the success of suicide bombers.
The following is an analysis of the current debates and issues surrounding the Israeli
Security Barrier. The complexity of the situation has created a worldwide conflict with

7

many different influences. The goal of the information below is to provide context to the
conflict that is currently taking place between Israel and the West Bank.

Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html
I. The Route
The route of the wall has become the center of much debate and discussion for
Israelis, Palestinians and the international community at large. When planning the route,
the Israeli government had to evaluate numerous variables, such as topography,
population density, and a threat assessment for each area. The end product created a path,
that weaved in and out of the West Bank, attempting to follow the Green Line, but
inevitably making abrupt turns to encompass Israeli interests and settlements.
The fence was built in stages. Phase A of construction, approximately 85 miles
from Salem to Elkana, was completed at the end of July 2003. Phase B, which is about 50
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miles, runs from Salem toward Bet-Shean, through the Jezreel Valley and the Gilboa
mountains. It was completed in 2004 (Kershner 18).
Phase C of construction incorporates Jerusalem, one of the most highly contested
territories in the world. During the al-Aqsa intifada, more than 30 suicide bombings
targeted Jerusalem. Between 2000 and 2008, a total of 90 terrorist attacks have killed 170
people and injured 1,500 in the capital (Kershner 19). The original “Jerusalem Defense
Plan” approved in March 2003 called for the fence to be constructed around three parts of
the capital, which has been the most frequent target of suicide bombers (Elizur 107). This
section of the fence was expected to run about 40 miles around the municipal boundaries
of the city. However, both Israeli and Palestinian residents in areas along the fence route
filed legal challenges that required changes in the construction plan (Cypel 391).
Phase D will span approximately 93 miles from Elkana to Ofer. In addition,
several special sections of the fence will protect specific areas and populations. An inside
fence of 15 miles will protect the road from the airport to Jerusalem. A fence around the
town of Ariel will stretch about 35 miles and a 31-mile section will traverse the road
between Ariel and Kedumim. A 32-mile span will go from Jerusalem to Gush Etzion, and
another 19 miles will surround Gush Etzion with the purpose of incorporating 10
settlements and approximately 50,000 Israelis. Finally, the fence will continue an
additional 58 miles to Carmel (Kershner 20).
There are 630 closures in the West Bank. Closures take the form of checkpoints,
partial checkpoints, road gates, roadblocks, earth mounds, trenches, road barriers, and
earth walls (Fernon 2). This number does not include a weekly reported average of 60-80
flying checkpoints over the West Bank. The government has also created 70 agricultural
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“gates” in the wall. These gates are situated in strategic locations of high agricultural
productivity. Essentially, Palestinians must cross through these gates in order to reach
their farms. In practice, these do not guarantee access of Palestinian farmers to their
lands but instead strengthen Israel’s system of permits and checkpoints imposed on
Palestinians in the West Bank (Fernon 3). The harm to the farming sector prevents
Palestinian farmers from gaining additional income and prevents an increase in the
number of Palestinians working in agriculture, which is a major sector of the Palestinian
economy. The wall will also create a situation in which 125,000 Palestinians will be
surrounded on three sides while 35,000 Palestinians will live in closed enclaves
(Makovsky 1).

Source:http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html
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II. Wall or Fence
There is a small debate surrounding the terminology for the new security
measures being put in place in Israel. Although the argument does not play an important
role in political debate, scholars have argued that it does play a significant role in the
psychological effect on the people encountering the barrier’s presence. In order to
examine this phenomenon, it is first necessary to investigate the construction of the
barrier.
It should be stressed that “barrier” will be used as a generic term for a physical
separation that will assume different forms in different locations. In places where Jewish
and Palestinian population centers are close to each other, it might take the form of a high
concrete wall that not only prevents infiltration by terrorists but also gives protection
against light arms fire. In other places, the barrier could be an electronic fence.
The fence construction is the more frequently used design and is augmented by a
number of static security features. On at least one or both sides are paved roads for patrol
vehicles that are surrounded by smooth strips of sand to track footprints of intruders. On
the Palestinian side there is a ditch or trench to stop vehicles from attempting to drive
through the fence. There are also pyramid stacks of sharp razor wire, some two meters
tall. With all of these features, the fence construction consumes about 30-70 meters of
space. Warning signs are placed on the fences with Arabic, Hebrew and English
warnings reading “Mortal Danger, Military Zone. Any person who passes or damages
the fence endangers his life” (Dolphin 22).
The wall construction is made of precast concrete sections that are generally 8
feet high. They are used in areas where the threat of sniper fire or gunfire is highly
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probable. These concrete walls are also put in places where it is difficult to build a fence
for geographical reasons. The concrete walls also include surveillance towers and
cameras. Relative to the fence construction system, these walls appear as formidable and
oppressive structures (Dolphin 24).
The debate surrounding the fence versus wall discussion does not question either
method’s effectiveness. In fact, both structures are equally effective and destructive in
terms of the security. However, on a psychological level the wall construction is much
more devastating. In a study done by the People’s Health Movement titled The Impact of
Israel’s Separation Wall on Palestinian Mental Health, 945 citizens of the West Bank
were sampled for a psychological study. Those citizens sampled who lived in areas
where a concrete wall surrounded them showed much more physical and emotional
symptoms than those who lived in villages with fences. The study showed that those
who were surrounded by physical walls demonstrated a lack of motivation to perform
daily actives, an appearance of paranoia, fear and sadness (PHM 2005). Furthermore, the
study explained that the negative impact of the wall on the Palestinian citizen increases
everyday because the wall negatively affects the basic physiological needs of the human
being, such as the need for security, love, a sense of belonging and the need to feel
appreciated which is the main factor for self esteem. Upon a physical look at the Wall,
according to the study, Palestinians can see that they are faced a set of blocks of steel and
cement surrounded by residential concentrations and closed within iron gates (PHM
2005). These blocks are difficult to break through and in practical terms, people living
inside them are isolated from their sources of income (economic isolation), threatening
the basic needs in terms of food, drink and medicine. Where as the fence provides some
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opportunity to see the other side, and thus possibly feel hope, the wall structure does not
provide any such hope for the future (PHM 2005).

Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/fence.html

III. Legal v. Illegal
The question of the legality of the Security Barrier is one of the most prominent
conversations surrounding its construction. Two courts have addressed the legal issues
regarding the placement of the security barrier as well as humanitarian impact that the
barrier has had.
The first court to adjudicate this matter was the Supreme Court of Israel. The
court ruled that when establishing the Security Barrier, the Israeli government has both a
legal and moral obligation to all its citizens. By law, the Israeli Supreme Court is a
creation of the Israeli legislature and is therefore representative of all people, regardless
of religion. Furthermore, the Israeli Supreme Court has a mandate to consider both sides
13

of the fence dispute. Its job is to balance the security needs of its citizens against the
humanitarian needs of the West Bank Palestinians (Dershowitz 101). The Israeli
Supreme Court has tried to strike that balance by upholding the creation of a security
fence while insisting that the Israeli military authorities give due weight to the needs of
the Palestinians, even if that requires some compromise with the security of Israelis. It is
important to note that under Israeli law the Israeli Supreme Court is open to all Israelis
including Arabs from Israel, Gaza and the West Bank. In fact, the Israeli Supreme Court
was, until recently, one of the only courts in the Middle East where an Arab could win a
case against his government (Dershowitz 102).
The second court to consider Israel’s security barrier was the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. No Israeli judge is allowed to serve on that court as a
permanent member, while several of the judges, like Judge Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf of
Somalia, represent countries that do not themselves abide by the rule of law (Dershowitz
103). On July 9, 2004 the ICJ rendered an advisory opinion in the case of the legality of
the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory that was brought before the
court by a emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly. Virtually
every democracy in our current world voted against the court’s decision to take
jurisdiction of the fence case, while nearly every country that voted to take jurisdiction
was a tyranny. The court found that “the construction of the wall being built by Israel,
the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East
Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law” (ICJ Press Release
2004). This legal decision was made by the ICJ through a series of steps that included:
the court establishing its jurisdiction, the court debating the legality of the construction of
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the wall and finally, the court providing legal consequences of the violations found (ICJ
Press Release 2004). Although an advisory opinion is not binding on the parties to a
conflict, such an opinion is highly regarded as it comes from the most distinguished
international legal body (Fernon 3). From Israel’s standpoint, the country owes the ICJ
absolutely nothing. It is under neither a moral nor a legal obligation to give any weight to
its predetermined decision.
The Supreme Court of Israel and the International Court of Justice have varying
opinions on the legality of the wall. The Supreme Court of Israel recognized the
unquestionable reality that the security fence has saved numerous lives and promises to
save more, but it also recognized that this benefit must not out weigh the material
disadvantages to West Bank Palestinians (Dershowitz 104). On the other hand, the
International Court of Justice dismissed the idea of saving lives and only focused on
Palestinian interests. The advisory opinion coupled with the preference of the ICJ for
Palestinian property rights over the lives of Jews demonstrates the one sided-ness of the
court (Fernon 4).
IV. Economics
There are two parts to the economic debate over the Security Barrier. The first
part deals with economic impacts of the wall within each territory, focusing on how the
wall will affect the Israeli and Palestinian economies respectively. The second part of the
debate questions the cost of the wall. This question includes a cost-benefit analysis
examining the billions of dollars that will be spent on the construction and maintenance
of the barrier in relation to its effectiveness.
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With regard to the economic impact, on the Israeli side, the terrorist attacks in the
more densely populated areas of the country have greatly damaged the Israeli economy
by causing a severe downturn in the tourism industry and forcing the government to bar
Palestinians from working in Israel. Israeli economic losses have ranged from 10 to 14
billion in shekels, which is a startling sum considering that Israel’s annual security budget
is 30 to 35 billion shekels2 (Ross 62). Building the barrier and thereby preventing
terrorists from reaching the densely populated areas of Israel would help to revitalize the
economy.
For the Palestinians, there is no doubt the completed fence will further impose
genuine economic hardships. Palestinian jobs in Israel will be jeopardized by the
closures of crossings through the wall. Limited access to Palestinian farms will also have
a substantial effect on the Palestinian economy. In many areas, the security barrier has
divided farmers from their land. The Israeli Government has granted Palestinians only
limited access to these farms and sometimes does not allow the farmers to get to their
farms at all. The lack of opportunity outside of the West Bank will cause the needs for
jobs to be created inside of the West Bank, which, due to limited resources, will be
extremely hard to achieve (Ross 64).
The second economic debate surrounds the cost of the wall. Built at a cost of $1.6
million to $2.5 million per mile, the separation barrier is the largest public construction
project in either Israel or the Palestinian Territories. It is almost two-thirds complete and
the cost of the project has already ballooned from a projected $1 billion to more than $2.1
billion (Ross 65). Many have questioned whether the price is actually worth the pay-off

2

1 USD=3.80 Israeli Shekels
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and wonder if the upkeep of the wall in the future will hurt the Israeli economy even
more.
V. Settlements
The settlement debate is both highly controversial and extremely complex. Since
the creation of the first section of the wall, Palestinians, Israelis and the international
community have criticized Israel for the way in which it has dealt with Israeli settlements
inside the West Bank. A map of the security barrier shows that, for the most part the
route follows the Green Line of 1949. However, when the barrier makes a turn into the
West Bank, it usually does so in order to keep an Israeli settlement within Israel’s de
facto borders, often with the consequence of cutting Palestinian villages in half and
separating Palestinians from their neighbors as well as their farms.
There are currently 121 Israeli settlements built on Palestinian land in the West
Bank. According to international law, all of these settlements are illegal and have been
condemned by both the United Nations Security Council as well as the international
community at large. A population of some 462,000 Israeli settlers inhabits these
settlements. Furthermore, approximately 385,000 settlers in 80 settlements will be
located between the Separation Wall and the Green Line if Israel holds to current plans
(Palestinian 3). Settlements are built on less than 3 percent of the area of the West Bank.
However, due to the extensive network of settler roads and restrictions on Palestinians
accessing their own land, Israeli settlements dominate more than 40 percent of the West
Bank. The largest settlement Ariel, which has a population of 40,000 and encompasses
1-2 per cent of the West Bank, has been targeted as the most controversial area in the
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West Bank because of Israel’s commitment to developing the settlement area (Palestinian
3-4).
Over the years there have been numerous settlement freezes as the world
continues to put pressure on the Israeli government. In an explanation by the Israeli
government, a statement was released stating: “ The fear is that erection of the barrier
will channel the attacks to these communities, so it was decided to have the fence pass
east of these settlements in order to provide protection for them and for the access roads
that reach them” (Lochery 86). Israel feels that these citizens need security and that
building the wall to surround these areas is the only way the government can succeed in
satisfying this need.
Many people in the International community believe that solution to this issue is
obvious. Opponents of the settlements argue that Israel needs to disband the settlements
entirely and move the settlers into Israel proper. However, this has become a difficult task
as the settlers have ideologically committed to staying on their land regardless of what
their government or military thinks. Many of these settlers have built their communities
in areas east of Israel proper and often east of the wall that encloses the majority of illegal
settlements. These settlers are often willing to use violence against both Israelis and
Palestinians to have their way, and have stepped up their acts of terror and intimidation
throughout the peace process. The settlement debate continues to be a major obstacle
surrounding the security barrier and will remain a contested topic until something
permanent is done.
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VI. Demography
Demography is defined as the statistical study of human population. It is no
secret that the world’s population of Jewish people is not that large. Even further, the
percentage of Jewish people within the borders of Israel, despite the increase in
population growth rate and the thousands of immigrants who come to Israel from other
areas of the world, is dropping while the number of Palestinians is rising. More and more
Israelis have started to realize that if partition does not happen soon, within a decade Jews
will be a minority in a “de facto bi-national state stretching from the Mediterranean to the
Jordan” (Makovsky 2). Minority status, moreover, would erode the legitimacy of Israel’s
Jewish government both at home and abroad. Therefore, to remain Jewish and
democratic, Israel needs to avoid absorbing areas or population groups that will
undermine its Jewish majority. Many have argued that the security barrier is a solution to
this issue. Israeli Jews, by constructing the barrier, are putting a physical obstacle in the
way of becoming a minority in their own country. This debate has caused a discussion
about the future of Israel’s borders. This barrier, after achieving its initial goal of
security, may act as a new legal border between the state of Israel and the Palestinian
entity. Creating such a border will allow the Jewish population of Israel to remain the
majority and thus remain in control of the state (Makovsky 2-4).
A World of Walls
Since the beginning of modern civilization, people have always looked for a way
to minimize their vulnerabilities. Whether this is a fence around their home, a moat
around their castle or a fortification around their country, people’s need for tangible
security has caused the construction of many different barriers. The Israeli Security
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Barrier is not the first of its kind, nor will it be the last. Below is a comprehensive
examination of a few other important “walls” that have either succeeded or failed in
providing security to other states throughout history.
I. Athens’ Long Walls
During the fifth century BCE, the miles of open, low-lying land between the
upper city of Athens and its key ports on the Saronic Gulf represented the city-states’
primary vulnerability (Sterling 13). Desiring to emphasize naval power despite this
intervening gap, the Athenians created a set of walls down to the coastline. Athens’ main
adversaries quickly learned about the unwelcome Long Walls. The decisions to build
fortified walls developed out of an assessment of Athens’ other options.
One basic option was based around the notion of expanding or improving the
army. Athens already possessed an effective and experienced land force that had
operated primarily in naval-infantry operations against Persia and other rebellious allies.
Although this option was feasible, as Athens had the money and men to increase its
forces, it had very little appeal. The Athenians did not regard their own force as deficient
and therefore felt no need to improve it. Also, increasing the manpower of the army
would ultimately mean a decrease in power of the navy, something most Athenians were
not inclined to support (Sterling 15). Another option discussed was the relocation of the
city center from Athens to Piraeus. This move would have fit perfectly with the navalcentered strategic outlook favored by most of the city-state. However, no such move
occurred, or even was attempted during any time period in Athenian history. After
centuries atop the Acropolis, relocating the city was too radical an idea (Sterling 16).
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Ultimately, the Long Walls offered the best response from a political
psychological and security perspective. Athens could build fortified walls to connect the
city of Piraeus with its ports, eliminating the imminent vulnerability posed by an invading
army. First, the wall would enable Athens to remain safe miles from the sea while still
maintaining the dominance of the navy. Second, adding to the political appeal of the
walls was the psychological comfort they would provide Athenians. Moreover, with the
Long Walls in place, Athens’ could pursue expansion and exploration without the worry
that the city would be captured (Sterling 22).
On a security level, and for its time, the Athens Long Walls had everything that a
security obstacle should. First, any attempt to scale the walls would prove extremely
difficult and result in large numbers of fatalities. Second, Athens’ major enemies did not
yet employ tunneling to go under walls. Third, strong walls, if constructed properly,
could withstand direct assaults, as technologies such as battering rams were not used yet.
Finally, bypassing the Long Walls would require a run-in with Athenian navy, which was
not a wish of any city-state or enemy of the time (Sterling 44-49).
Unfortunately, not much physical evidence of the Athens Long Walls exists
today. However, examining the information about these walls provides us with an idea of
why Athens chose to build such a fortification. The construction of the walls removed
the final vulnerability of the city-state’s most prominent area and allowed Athenians to
pursue other endeavors while continuing to strengthen the navy. The Long Walls enabled
Athens to survive any siege. No enemy could capture the city as long as it was connected
to its ports and controlled the sea.
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Source: http://www.utexas.edu/courses/introtogreece/lect11/img32athpiraeslngwlls.html

II. Hadrian’s Wall
Whereas fifth century BCE Athens was a rising power looking to eliminate its
primary vulnerability, Rome in the early 120s CE presented a somewhat different context
and challenge. The Hadrianic government, located in Britain, was one of the strongest
powers in history and was already extremely well established. However, it struggled to
manage and secure new domains after expanding and acquiring new territory. Unlike in
Athens, the Hadrianic government’s enemy was not a trained and skilled army. Instead,
it was British-Scottish tribes who raided and skirmished towns and cities in Northern
England (Sterling 68). Essentially, Hadrian’s Wall was constructed as a means to control
the government’s newly acquired frontiers.
The wall, stretching from the North Sea to the Irish Sea, was 80 Roman miles
(about 73 modern miles) long, 8-10 feet wide, and 15 feet high (Sterling 70). In addition
to the wall, the Romans built a system of small forts called milecastles every Roman mile
along its entire length, with towers every 1/3 mile. Sixteen larger forts holding from 500
to 1000 troops were built into the wall, with large gates on the north face. To the south of
the wall the Romans dug a wide ditch with six foot high earth banks (Sterling 89). The
wall not only reflected the power of Roman empire but it also succesfully helped control
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immigration, smuggling and customs. Furthermore, Hadrian’s Wall succesfully reflected
the policy of Hadrian which was defense before expansion. The wall enabled the Roman
empire to defend itself from invading tribes north of Britain who found it difficult to
cross over the blockade. Altogether, the Romans built the most advanced and effective
security barrier of the time period.

Source: NormanEinstein, September 20, 2005.

III. The Great Wall of China
The Great Wall of China is the most unique and largest physical security structure
that the world has ever seen. It was created and built over hundrerds of years and
stretches thousands of miles. Built in two stages, the early stage and the Ming Dynasty
stage, the wall originally served as a protection barrier to ward off the invasion of
different nomadic groups. The wall itself stretches from Shanhaiguan District in the
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north-east of China to Nayu Pass in the West of China. The exact measurement of the
wall has been debated but the wall is approximatley 5,500 miles in length (Sterling 118).
The Early Wall stage began under the rule of Qin Shi Huang and the Qin Dynasty.
To protect his newly acquired empire against intrusions by the nomadic tribes to the
north, Qin ordered the construction of a wall to connect the remaining fortifications along
his new northern frontier. Although there are no historical records, many have concluded
that the cost of the wall in people, materials and money was very high because
transporting all of these goods to the north took time and resources. However, once
created, the wall seemed to be an effective deterrent for nomadic tribes as there was a
decrease in both invasions and violence in the northern parts of China (Sterling 130).
Although the Early Wall stage laid the beginning foundations, it was during the
Ming Era that the Great Wall was truly constructed. Early on, the Ming Dynasty battled
to gain superiority over the Manchurian and Mongolian tribes to the north (Sterling 135).
After numerous battles and countless resources used, the Ming developed a new strategy
to keep the nomadic tribes from entering their empire: construct a wall. The new wall
would be constructed along the entirety of the northern border and would differ from the
Qin wall in strength and complexity. The Ming dynasty employed bricks to create the
wall and these bricks proved to be stronger and easier to work with than the previous
materials of clay, sand, williow branches and reeds. The Mings also chose to place
watchtowers and lookout points throughout the wall for the purpose of spotting enemies
coming from further away than before (Sterling 142). The Great Wall proved to be
effective numerous times especially during the Manchu invasions that began around the
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1600s. Although the Manchu’s eventually conquered the wall and invaded China it took
them 44 years of hard battling to do so (Sterling 148).

Source: http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/tourist-maps/great-wall-china/

IV. The Maginot Line
The Maginot Line, which is named after the French Minister of War Andre
Maginot, was a wall of concrete fortifications and obstacles aimed at deterring attacks on
the country. It was constructed by France along the borders of Germany and Italy after
the devastations of World War I (Sterling 206). The idea for the fortification came from
the success of defensive warfare that was executed or practiced throughout much of
World War I. France realized that it had a vulnerable and unprotected area that was open
to attack and attempted to not only fortify this location but also make it an offensive
weapon. Furthermore, the creation of such a fortification provided the French army,
which took numerous days to mobilize, extra time in the event of an attack (Sterling 211).
After the initial design, military experts concluded that the Maginot Line was a
work of greatness, believing it would prevent any further invasions from the east of
France, most notably from Germany. According to the French, the Maginot Line was
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impervious to most types of attack, and had state-of-the-art living conditions for its troops
(Sterling 223). Although the line was state-of-the-art, it came with a steep cost. The line
consumed a vast amount of money and subsequently led to other parts of the French
Armed Forces being underfunded.
Unfortunately, the Maginot Line did not serve its purpose of providing security to
France during World War II. In fact, the invasion plan of the German army during WWII
was designed specifically to deal with the line. The Germans sent a decoy force to the
line while simultaneously sending a second army group to cut through Belgium and the
Netherlands. The Germans were able to avoid direct battle with the forces placed on the
Maginot Line and were able to gain entry into France within five days of their first
invasion (Sterling 242). Inevitably, the Germans chose to attack the fortifications of the
Maginot Line and successfully gained control of the majority of the line. When World
War II ended, the use of the Maginot Line did too. The fortification proved ineffective
and fairly useless and the French decided it was no longer necessary to spend money on
the line (Sterling 251).

source: http://www.toptenz.net/top-10-greatest-military-blunders-of-world-war-ii.php
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V. Other walls
These are just a few of the security fortifications that have existed historically.
Other walls such as the Berlin Wall, the Bar-Lev Line in Israel, the newly constructed
US-Mexico border fence, and the wall between India and Pakistan were or have been
constructed for a certain reason. Whether for security, separation or dominance these
barriers serve a purpose. The Israeli Security Barrier is no different than these other
walls, as it too has been built to accomplish a goal.
Conclusion
This literature review has provided insight into the current debates and issues
surrounding the Israeli security barrier. Examining these different issues has provided a
powerful background to the extremely controversial security barrier. Moreover,
reviewing other walls that have existed throughout time has allowed for a greater
understanding of the concept behind physical defense systems. The following chapters
will employ the debates and issues presented in this literature review to examine two
major pieces of the Israeli security barrier. The next chapter of this paper will
incorporate the offense-defense theory by exploring the offensive and defensive nature of
the barrier and will analyze whether the barrier is an offensive or defensive entity. The
following chapter will examine the other political goals behind the Israeli security barrier.
This chapter will dissect the reasons for construction of the barrier and work to clarify
why the Israeli government decided to build this structure.
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Chapter II: Offense-Defense Theory
In the book Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, Stephen Van Evera
proposed his idea of the offense-defense theory. This theory attempts to discern what
factors increase the likelihood that states will go to war. Van Evera offers three
hypotheses:
1. War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy, or is believed
easy, than in other periods.
2. States that have, or believe they have, large offensive opportunities or
defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states.
3. Actual examples of true imbalances are rare and explain only a moderate
amount of history. However, false perceptions of these factors are common and
thus explain a great deal of history (Van Evera 21).
These hypotheses sit at the heart of the offense-defense theory. Through his discussion,
Van Evera provides insight into the complexity of the offense-defense relationship. Van
Evera is neither the first nor the last person to write about this phenomenon. In fact,
many scholars have tackled the issue of the offense-defense balance by examining how
different variables affect the military scale. The offense-defense theory is now widely
used to explain many aspects of war and conflict. The following is an exploration of
some of the most prominent theories surrounding the offense-defense paradox.
I. Offense and Defense in the International System, George Quester
George Quester has been dubbed as one of the pioneers of the offense-defense
argument. His book revolutionized the way in which people viewed offense and defense
in the international system. His discussion begins with the claim that the offensivedefensive argument is primarily one about military capability. Quester attempts to solve
the dilemma by identifying the “technical, political and social factors that make it
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advantageous to strike out offensively at the enemy rather than sitting in a prepared
defensive positions waiting for the enemy to strike” (Quester 2).
According to Quester, offenses are favored, and offensive action is far more
likely, when a situation is created in which more casualties will occur if attacking first is
not the chosen tactic. Therefore, war must be driven by calculations of gain and loss.
Quester provides an example of this offense-defense paradigm. He writes, “If a single
bomber airplane can use gravity for the destruction of many hostile airplanes that it
catches on an airfield below, this is a technological development that favors the
offensive. If a well-planned minefield imposes heavy casualties on an army trying to
attack a fortified machine-gun nest, this is a technology that discourages taking the
offensive and reinforces the defense” (Quester 6). Essentially, Quester is making an
argument that the choice to be offensive or defensive derives from predictions about the
likely outcome of a maneuver.
Quester becomes more specific when he discusses the use of weapons. Some
weapons, according to Quester, might have helped offensive as well as defensive
operations, if only they could have been moved along with an advancing army to help it
with the battles (Quester 7). However, the inability of certain weapons to move classifies
them as only helping the defense. The minefields that Quester mentions above are an
example of this, as are antiaircraft guns or fixed artillery positions along coasts. Since
there is an inability to bring these weapons to the enemy, the enemy must come to the
weapons. Inevitably, the immobile weapons become “supremely defensive” whenever a
conflict is being fought abroad (Quester 8).
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Quester argues that this phenomenon makes mobility a strictly offensive value.
First, mobility allows a country to invade with power if it can bring all of the deadly
vehicles of destruction with it. Second, the ability to move may allow an attacking force
to exploit various weak spots or blind spots of the force that is standing in place (Quester
8). Third, the ability to move allows an attacking force to group itself, and regroup itself,
when it decides to battle again. Mobility allows the offensive to make sense because of
the opportunity to choose the time and place of the battle as well as the odds (Quester 8).
By contrast any weapon that relates to “peculiarities of terrain” will be supportive
of the defense. Such natural occurring obstacles like marshlands, mountains, jungles or
even our contemporary urban sprawl will favor the defense (Quester 9). This is because
the army defending such a region is likely to be more at home with its “peculiarities“ than
the alien army. Also, these “peculiarities” provide natural defensive obstacles to
invading forces. Overall, Quester is making the argument that those weapons that are
permanently fixed support the defensive position. On the other hand, if the weapons are
mobile, the offense is favored. Finally, Quester argues that shifts in military technology
affect the incentives and capabilities for the offensive (Quester 10).

II. Offense and Defense Theory: An Empirical Assessment, Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z
Haftel, and Kevin McSweeney
Building on many of the arguments put forth by Quester, these theorists suggests
that shifts in the offense-defense balance have a considerable effect on the likelihood of
war and crisis in the international system. Gortzak, et al. state, “Factors that increase the
ease of offensive operations or that significantly reduce the costs of such operations,
relative to defensive operations, are argued to increases the probability of international
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war and crisis” (Gortzak et al. 69). These authors explain that the development of new
technology and weapons, which favor the offensive, trigger the incentive to enter a
conflict with another state. More than this, the current nature of the international system
does not allow “states to rely solely on the perceived intentions of their potential rival to
ensure their survival” (Gortzak et al. 72). Instead, the authors believe that countries are
forced to assume intentions from rivals and act accordingly. Offense dominant states
produce behavior through “flexing” technology and weaponry that allows rivals to
understand that there is a threat. Defense dominant states communicate a strategy of
protection and security. According to Gortzak et al., rivals will act accordingly to these
actions and draw conclusions about offensive or defensive intentions (Gortzak et al. 72).
The authors conclude that “by adding factors that affect the probability of the success or
failure of offensive strategies to existing theories about war and peace, we can greatly
increase our ability to explain and predict the likelihood of violent disputes and wars in
the international system” (Gortzak et al. 78).

III. Attack and Conquer? International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-Deterrence
Balance, Karen Ruth Adams
In this work, Karen Adams focuses on the changing nature of the offense-defense
balance while simultaneously incorporating deterrence in to the equation. She argues
that offense and defense changes over time, meaning that states should be “more
vulnerable to conquest and more likely to attack one another at some times than others
(Adam 46).” More specifically, Adams provides an explanation of two time periods in
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which “offensive operations”3 and “defensive operations”4 are more likely to occur
(Adams 47).
The first time period, offense-dominant eras, is when offense is easier than
defense. This means that defenders’ military forces should be more likely to collapse or
surrender in response to offensive military threats. In offense-dominant eras, states
should be attacked more often (Adams 48). Moreover, offense-dominant eras provide a
heightened vulnerability, which allows states to act on the idea that the best defense is a
good offense. The second time period, defense-dominant eras, allows states with “stateof the art capabilities” to declare war and then wait to counterattack without hurting their
chances of survival (Adams 49). This means that powerful states, during defensedominant eras, who have superior weaponry and military capability can choose to create
a conflict but then wait to be attacked. This will allow the state to employ defensive
techniques to protect its interests while simultaneously having the opportunity to destroy
a rival. Offense-dominant eras provide security through attacking first while defensedominant eras provide security through limitation of attacks.
Adams also finds it necessary to distinguish between defense and deterrence.
First, she explains that deterrent operations are actions in which “a state prepares to use
force or demonstrates its ability to use force to attack another states nonmilitary assets to
deter that state from attacking it or to deter if rom further attacks once a war has begun
(Adams 52).” From this statement it can be concluded that deterrent operations entail
Offensive operations: are actions in which a state uses force to attack another state’s military or
nonmilitary assets to conquer its territory or compel compliance with policy directives (impose its
will on the other state)
4
Defensive Operations: are actions in which a state uses force against another state’s military
assets to repel and limit damage from that state’s attacks to retain control of its territory and avoid
having the other state impose its will upon it.
3
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punishment while the defensive operations mentioned above are aimed at limiting
damage. Adams provides a nice summary of her theory that states,
…because states are less vulnerable to conquest and less likely to attack one another
in defense- and especially deterrence-dominant eras, it is not the case, as offensive
realists claim, that states act aggressively to survive. Neither is it the case, as
defensive realist suggest, that states act aggressively only when their security is
threatened… (Adams 78).
Her comments here point to the idea that she believes defense and deterrence will allow a
state to be more comfortable in the international system by providing greater security. At
the same time states need to remember that nonaggressive does not equate to safety
(Adams 79). Adams’ deterrence and offensive-defensive time period argument provides
an interesting take on the offense-defense conversation.

IV. Polarity, The Offense-Defense Balance And War, Ted Hopf
According to Ted Hopf, the offense-defense balance consists of three elements.
The first is the Technical Offense-Defense Military Balance concerning the relative
military advantages enjoyed by the offense or defense on the battlefield. The second
element is the Cumulativity of Power Resources. Hopf explains this as the relative
availability of the resources that make military capability possible. The third element is
the set of Strategic Beliefs held by the leaders of great powers regarding their relative
concern for their reputation, or credibility (Hopf 477).
More specifically, the Technical Offense and Defense Military Balance focuses
on the idea that offensive and defensive advantages should be separated into tactical and
strategic categories (Hopf 478). Tactical offensive advantage, according to Hopf, is the
ability to seize a piece of an enemy’s territory at less cost to oneself than it requires for
the defender to protect it or retrieve it (Hopf 479). A strategic offensive advantage,
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according to Hopf, is the ability to seize and/or occupy as much of an enemy’s territory
as is necessary to destroy its military potential at less cost to oneself than is required for
the defender to protect its territory or retake it (Hopf 479).
The Cumulativitiy of Power Resources investigates the “affect of the availability
and extractability of power resources on the offense-defense theory” (Hopf 480).
Available power resources, according to Hopf, are the material elements that constitute
military and economic power in a given historical period (Hopf 485). Inevitably, the
resources of power and their geographical locations change over time. For example, in
the past states may have attacked the industrial sectors of their rivals to weaken their
enemies’ economic safety. Today, state actors focus more on attacking industries like
petroleum and uranium deposits because of the powerful relevance of these resources
(Hopf 486). Hopf argues that the greater the relevance of another state’s resources to
increasing ones own power, the greater the incentive to go to war. This creates a
situation in which the lower the costs of occupation and the more readily transferable the
resources of power are the greater the instability and thus the higher chance of attack
(Hopf 486). Inevitably, an establishment of this situation favors the offensive because it
allows a state to gain an advantage and thus have a greater chance of successful attack.
Finally, the Strategic Beliefs component discusses that the knowledge possessed
by ruling elites of great nations about how the international system operates plays a role
in the offense-defense paradigm. According to Hopf, offensive strategic beliefs assume
that rulers will be very concerned if they allow another state to gain a military victory
anywhere in the international arena (Hopf 488). This victory can cause all actors in the
system to “learn lessons about offense and defense” (Hopf 489). First, the rulers of
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victorious states will believe that they can successfully challenge the positions of the
recently defeated. Second, “the defeated state’s allies will begin to question the
advisability of relying on the former’s security guarantees, given its recent record, and
hence will tend to bandwagon with rather than balance against, any future efforts at
expansion by the recent aggressor” (Hopf 489). The final lesson is that states, which are
located in the neighborhood of the recent victor, will “fall like dominoes into the lap of
the aggressor, rather than redoubling their efforts to balance against this ascendant threat”
(Hopf 489). On the other hand, Hopf argues that defensive beliefs create rulers who are
“unconcerned about their credibility, confident that allies will balance, not bandwagon,
and that dominoes will not fall after their adversary’s victories” (Hopf 489).
Hopf’s three-element argument about the offense-defense theory continues to
build on the original conversation that George Quester began in his book. Hopf’s
argument examines a wider range of possible reasons for offensive and defensive
decisions made by a state while providing powerful insight into the offense-defense
relationship in the international system.

V. Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory, Stephen Biddle
Stephen Biddle’s work on the offense-defense theory is extremely complex
because of the uniqueness of his argument. According to Biddle the “offense-defense
balance” plays an important role across a wide range of modern international relations
theory (Biddle 742). The theory itself has been used to explain the causes of war,
alliance formation, arms racing, crisis behavior, the size of states and the structure of the
international system. The widespread use of the offense-defense balance is fueled by the
appeal that the balance makes sense on a military level. Current theories, like the ones
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explored above, focus on “how the military prospects for attack ought to affect the
likelihood of aggression or that arms races should be more intense when technology is
better suited for attack than defense” (Biddle 743). Biddle argues that these current
theories are “underspecified and problematic” (Biddle 743). The previous theories focus
entirely on the consequences of the balance, essentially examining what happens when
the balance is tipped.
Biddle has proposed a new theory of the offense-defense balance that is designed
to overcome what he believes are the two shortcomings of the existing arguments. The
first shortcoming is “the current theories exclude a crucial class of causal variables”
(Biddle 745). There are strong theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the
existing theories reliance on structural material factors like force size, geography and
especially technology is misplaced. Therefore, according to Biddle, the new theory relies
heavily on national strategic and tactical choices as the key determinants of the relative
ease of attack and defense (Biddle 746). The second shortcoming discusses that the
current theories of the “balance-as-effect are indeterminate” (Biddle 747). The broad
idea that geography, force size and patterns of diplomatic action can alter the offensedefense balance provides a list of “independent variables”, but there is no mechanism for
interrelating them (Biddle 750). Biddle argues that “the technology theory offers no
operationally measurable specification: neither defense-conducive firepower nor offenseconducive mobility has unambiguous referents and many technologies simultaneously
increase both” (Biddle 751).
Biddle, to counter these weaknesses creates new theory that concludes three major
findings. First, his new theory implies that the security dilemma cannot be eliminated
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from the offense-defense discussion. Biddle believes that states cannot solely construct
“defense-conducive military postures to defend themselves” (Biddle 769). For states, the
goal of being strictly defensive is unattainable. Instead, Biddle concludes that states, in
order to be secure, must “implement tactics that could also enable successful attacks
against neighbors” (Biddle 768). Second, the new theory implies a “higher frequency of
future war than orthodox offense-defense theory” (Biddle 769). According to Biddle, this
stems from the above idea that the security-dilemma cannot be eliminated. Essentially,
the importance of force employment will lead to more situations in which war arises.
Finally, Biddle’s new theory implies a “number of new directions for the investigation”
(Biddle 770). Biddle believes that the offense-defense theory will expand to explain “a
host of important political outcomes” (Biddle 770). He argues that the offense-defense
theory will continue to be employed in the discussion of conflict but may also evolve to
help explain larger political choices.
Biddle’s argument focuses on the balance part of the offense-defense balance. He
provides a more systematic theory to explain the balance, which sheds new light on the
wide variety of international relations theories that use it. Biddle’s new theory of balance
is important (Biddle 768). He provides a new perspective on the theories of more
orthodox positions about technology as the powerful variable in the offense-defense
balance. Biddle also argues that offense-defense distinctions do matter and must be
taken into account to understand political outcomes. The ability to attack and the ability
to defend are not the same; they can and must be distinguished (Biddle 770).
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The Israeli Security Barrier: Offensive or Defensive
Before beginning a discussion about whether the Israeli security barrier is an
offensive maneuver or defensive structure it is first necessary to briefly review the
situation surrounding the barrier. Officially, the security barrier is being built by a stateactor (Israel) to stop a non-state actor (Palestinian’s) from infiltrating its borders.
Unofficially, the barrier is also being built to create a permanent border between the
Israeli state and the non-state Palestinian entity. Either way, the offense-defense theories
presented above focus solely on interactions between states in the international system
that have the ability to engage each other in modern warfare. Although the situation
between the Palestinians and Israeli’s is not classified as a war, the conflict has taken on
many war like characteristics, which have created anoffense-defense struggle between the
two entities. Whether it has been Israel invading parts of the West Bank (offense),
terrorist organizations bombing buses in Tel-Aviv (offense), or constant patrols by the
Israeli Defense Force along the border of Israel, there has been a constant relevance of
offense-defense theory throughout this conflict. The new barrier, which has become the
ultimate weapon of security for the Israeli state, is no different. Is the Israeli security
barrier being built for offensive or defensive purposes? The following provides an
answer to this question through an examination of the relationship between the current
theories of the offense-defense balance and the major debates surrounding the barrier.
I. Barrier Technology
Many theories surrounding the offense-defense argument focus on technology.
Israeli society is famously known for its advancements in military as well as other types
of technology. The countries expertise in this area is shown through the incorporation
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advanced into the creation of the security barrier. Although the wall appears to be
extremely simplistic, it is actually a complex militarized entity that provides intelligence
and security to the country. Most offense-defense theories place a large emphasis on the
importance of advanced technology. However, the difference between offensive and
defensive use of said technology derives from the way in which the technology is
employed.
George Quester’s argument focuses heavily on the technology aspect and bases
the divide between offense and defense on the mobility of weapons (the technology).
Immobile weapons, according to Quester, are defensive because an attacker must travel
to the weapon instead of having the weapons come to them. Therefore, these weapons are
meant to protect the location of their fortified position. To this end, the wall becomes
defensive, as there is nothing more immobile than miles of concrete wall and barbwire
fence. If a battle over the wall were to occur it would take place at the wall, bringing the
fight directly to Israeli border.
Furthermore, Quester’s theory continues by pointing out that defensive strategy
also relates to “peculiarities” of terrain. By “peculiarities” Quester is referencing natural
occurrences like mountains, rivers and jungle. Although the barrier is not a naturally
occurring structure, it can be argued that its construction has changed the natural
landscape of the Israeli-Palestinian border forever, making the wall a part of the terrain
and environment. It is obvious that this new structure poses a physical security obstacle
and thus favors the defensive.
Stephen Biddle also makes an argument for technology. Biddle believes that
technology is always an offensive force but should be treated as an insignificant measure
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because of the constant development of new technology. More sophisticated technology
will always allow for a more powerful offensive maneuver. Israeli technology surpasses
the opposing Palestinian forces capabilities by incredible amounts, thus placing the wall
in the offensive category. As Israeli technology continues to change over the next few
years there will continue to be more offensive gains through the use of this technology.
II. The Route
To date, the route of the Israeli Security Barrier continues to be one of the most
contested issues surrounding the wall. The placement of the wall has been extremely
strategic and done in a very particular way to secure certain Israeli interests, which
include protecting settlements and important geographic locations. For some, the
ultimate goal of the wall is to separate the Israeli people from the Arabs in the West
Bank, thus securing the Israeli state behind a physical blockade. The route has every
intention of accomplishing this goal and makes no concessions to the people living in the
West Bank. Deciding whether the route maneuvers are offensive or defensive is not a
simple task.
The theory of Ted Hopf would place the careful route planning as an offensive
maneuver by the Israeli government. More specifically, Hopf’s Technical Offense and
Defense Military Balance argument states, “…a strategic offensive advantage is the
ability to seize and/or occupy as much of an enemy’s territory at less cost to oneself that
is required for the defender to protect its territory or retake it (Hopf 479).” According to
this idea, the Israeli government is strategically removing land from the Palestinian entity
because it has both the power and ability to do so. Although the international community
believes the land belongs the Palestinians, the Israeli government is offensively claiming
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this land as theirs by constructing a barrier on it. Furthermore, the Palestinian entity
cannot do anything about this situation through defense, which creates a low cost
offensive situation for the Israeli government.
To further prove this, Hopf’s theory of Cumulativity of Power Resources can also
be employed. This theory admits that state actors, who are acting offensively, focus on
attacking relevant resources. Moreover, Hopf comments that the more important a
resource is the more likely it will be attacked so that power can be removed from the
enemy. An examination of the ability of the wall to conveniently cut Palestinian farmers
off from their farmland produces a result that supports Hopf’s argument. In this instance,
the security barrier plays a very dangerous offensive role by eliminating a food staple for
the Palestinian population. There is nothing more important or “relevant” than the
agricultural staples of a society. In this regard, the security barrier is being used as an
offensive entity by the Israeli government by attacking the enemy through the removal of
a resource.
On the other hand, examining Karen Adam’s theory would place the calculated
route in the defensive category. Her discussion of offense vs. defense eras provides
evidence that the wall currently sits in a defensive state. This is because Adam’s
demonstrates that defense choices provide security through limitation of attacks. By
limiting access to Israel, the security barrier is working as a defensive tool. Palestinian’s
must cross through one of the designated border crossings where heavy screening and
necessary identification is required to be admitted to Israel. These specifically designed
gateways that are placed strategically throughout the barrier enable the Israeli security
forces to limit access to the state, which in turn works limit any type of attack.
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According to Adams, the ability to remove a threat before it is created would be the
ultimate defensive move. The barriers ability to accomplish this with extreme success
provides support for the defensive nature of the wall.
By investigating Stephen Biddle’s new theory that relies heavily on national
strategic and tactical choices as the key determinants of the relative ease of attack and
defense it can also be concluded that the route of the wall employs a defensive tactic. As
stated above, the route of the wall is extremely strategic. According to Biddle, strategic
and national choices are taken in to account when a state is making military decisions.
Offensive decisions will be ones that leave the state more vulnerable but ultimately have
a high payoff. Defensive decisions will come with less gain but higher levels of security.
The route of the security barrier, according to this argument, would thus be a defensive
decision by the Israeli state. The barrier accomplishes the state goal of creating stronger
security through defensive measures.
III. Suicide Terror
As a non-state actor the terrorist organizations in Palestine have used suicide
terror as their main offensive weapon against the Israeli state. To stop these attacks,
which have occurred at constant rates in past years, the Israeli government decided to
build the security barrier. The barrier allowed limits to be placed on the travel between
the West Bank and Israel, which ultimately stopped the flow of terrorists across the
border.
Quester’s mobility argument that is discussed in his offense-defense theory
suggests that the terrorist organizations are using offensive techniques to target the Israeli
people. Although the suicide bombs do not fall under the title of conventional warfare
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tactics that Quester uses to support his argument, it can still be concluded that the
mobility of the terrorist makes the action purely offensive. To combat this offensive
tactic used by the terrorist organizations, Israel must employ a defensive policy to remove
the threat of attack. Quester, through his discussion of the “minefield” presented earlier
in this chapter, provides evidence of how the wall can act as this defensive barrier. He
states, “If a well-planned minefield imposes heavy casualties on an army trying to attack
a fortified machine gun nest, this is a technology that discourages taking the offensive
and reinforces the defense” (Quester 6). Although the wall does not impose death to a
suicide bomber, it does significantly stifle the capabilities and success of the attack. The
need to cross a concrete barrier that is monitored by cameras, motion detectors and
constant soldier patrol creates a figurative “minefield” for suicide bombers that destroys
their plans of attack. According to this argument, the once permeable border of Israel is
now a fortified defensive entity aimed at defending Israel’s citizens from attacking
forces.
To counter the defense argument in this situation, Karen Adam’s would focus on
her offense-dominant era theory. This theory’s core message is that forces are more likely
to concede as a response to greater military threat from the opposing side. Dealing with
suicide bombers is a hard phenomenon to tackle because of the relative ease with which
bombers can disguise themselves and their deadly weapons. Prior to the construction of
the barrier a bomber had the ability to cross into Israel undetected, making it incredibly
easy for their mission to become a success. Today, a bomber is much more likely to
concede his mission when faced with an eight foot wall complete with motion sensors
and barbed wire. According to Adam’s, the threat of getting caught by the Israeli
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Defense Forces coupled with the new challenges and difficulty of navigating an advanced
set of barriers provides Israel with an offensive advantage over the attacking bomber.
This situation creates the opportunity for Israel to demonstrate its supreme power over
the bombers by threatening them with new obstacles.
Another offensive argument about the barriers role in stopping suicide terror can
be connected with the theory of Yoav Gortzak, Yoram Z Haftel, and Kevin McSweeney.
These theorists argue that when countries “generate incentives for preemptive strikes and
preventive measures” (Gortzak et al. 72) there is a shift towards the offensive. From
Israel’s standpoint there are numerous reasons to prevent suicide attacks from happening
within the country. First and foremost is the necessity of the state to provide security to
its citizens. Preemptively removing a threat to the Israeli citizens by hindering the
attackers abilities to enter the country is an easy and powerful way to provide security.
According to Gortzak, et al. if a suicide bomber does not have the opportunity to detonate
his bomb on Israeli soil because of the preventative and preemptive measures in place,
the barrier is essentially serving its purpose as an offensive weapon.
V. Deterrence
It is necessary to stop and examine a third idea that deals with neither offense nor
defense. Instead, a brief discussion of the deterrence theory will provide additional
insight into the strategic point of the barrier. Karen Adam’s discussed the deterrence
balance phenomenon in her writings. She provides a definition of what is called a
“deterrent operation” as “actions in which a state prepares to use force or demonstrates its
ability to use force to attack another states nonmilitary assets to deter that state from
attacking it or to deter if from further attacks once a war has begun” (Adams79). The
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Israeli security barrier, in some ways, can be seen as a demonstration of Israeli
capabilities and thus act as a deterrent to opposing forces. The barrier, regardless of its
purpose, is a strong reminder of the superiority of the Israeli economy and military.
In his book “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” Brent Sterling presents an
argument about barriers as deterrents. He states that,
Barriers exacerbation of adversary hostility raises the importance of their
deterrent potential. In contrast to the more commonly used deterrence by
punishment approach of threatening unacceptable retaliation, states aim for
strategic defenses to facilitate deterrence by denial through convincing an
adversary that its objective is not obtainable, at least not at an acceptable cost or
risk (Sterling 315).
According to Sterling’s statement, the Israeli security barrier would be a deterrent to any
threats because it denies terrorist the ability to achieve their goal. The ideas put forth in
this section from Sterling hold true for the Israeli security barrier. The barrier creates an
incredibly difficult obstacle for terrorists who are trying to infiltrate Israel. In fact, the
barrier denies terrorist the ability to carry out attacks because of the low probability
terrorist have at crossing through the barrier. Figuring out a way to bypass or get through
the barrier would cost a lot of time, energy and money. Therefore, the barrier creates
unacceptable costs and risks for terrorists who now choose to refrain from attempting
suicide terror on the Israeli state.
George Quester provides further support for this deterrent phenomenon when he
discusses the effect of World War I on the offense-defense theory. He writes, “…the
costs of testing a prepared defensive position were now obviously great; if repeated tests
were required before an offensive breakthrough occurred, many nations might lack the
desire to attempt these tests in the future” (Quester 114-115). In order for terrorists to
successfully gain access to Israel for their attacks they would have to repeatedly attempt
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to figure out a possible way to get in to the state. These attempts would result in
numerous consequences, including arrest and imprisonment, which may outweigh the
rewards of the end goal. Moreover, the time spent working to figure out a solution to
accessing Israel may be time better spent figuring out another offensive tactic. These
results would ultimately deter terrorists from continuing to attack Israel through suicide
terror.
The idea that the Israeli security barrier is in actuality acting as a deterrent adds a
new piece to this complicated equation. The deterrent theory, although strong, does not
provide enough concrete support to make a viable argument for deterrence as the main
military and political goal of the barrier. It is true that the barrier was erected to deter
terrorists from committing attacks on Israel. It is also true that the barrier has
accomplished its goal in deterring terrorists by placing a major obstacle between them
and their target. If the security barrier was only constructed to stop terrorists from
entering Israel then deterrence would have applied in this situation. However, it is
important to remember that many people believe the barrier is not only about stopping
suicide terror. Acknowledging the notion that the barrier has other political goals creates
an argument for the structure as an offensive or defensive entity and not a deterrent.
Conclusion: Is the Best Defense a Good Offense?
After examining the current theories surrounding the offense-defense controversy,
it is apparent that the Israeli security barrier cannot be classified as solely an offensive or
defensive entity. Each aspect of the barrier that has been examined in this chapter can be
interpreted using both the offensive and the defensive. For example, the route of the
barrier is offensive in nature because its construction near Palestinian farms removes a
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relevant resource from the Palestinians. On the other hand, the wall itself has defensive
tendencies because of its immobile nature. Furthermore, the evaluation of suicide terror
showed an offensive purpose of the barrier through the use of preventative and
preemptive tactics. This exploration has provided an illustration that shows how all parts
of this barrier are interconnected. Each concrete block or chain-linked fence serves an
offensive or defensive purpose.
If the conclusion here is that the barrier is neither offensive nor defensive why
does the investigation of this topic even matter? It is necessary to examine the offensive
and defensive components of this barrier in order to further understand the decision to
create such a wall. Leaving the legality issue out of the conversation, the above
investigation provides strong justification for the creation of this security barrier as a
means to stop suicide terror. As a state, Israel has the right to defend its borders and
citizens. Moreover, Israel has the right to take offensive actions against those who
choose to attack its borders. The security barrier accomplishes both while simultaneously
limiting the loss of Israeli human life.
The above investigation also provides insight into other motives behind the
construction of the wall. A very deliberate point of the wall is to incorporate key
settlement blocks and pieces of the West Bank into Israel. This policy, which can be seen
as both offensive and defensive, gains more credibility with the employment of the
offense-defense theory. Interpreting the decision of the Israeli government to carve out
certain sections of the West Bank with the barrier from an offensive or defensive
perspective removes criticism about Israel’s and establishes a greater understanding of
the need for certain choices and decisions to be made. Offensively, the Israeli
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government believes that incorporating this land into Israel will further weaken the
Palestinian entity and thus provide Israel with a stronger and more powerful nation.
Defensively, the Israeli government feels the need to control this land so that it can
continue to stop terrorists from violently attacking citizens. In this way, the offensedefense theory is extremely important to the case of the Israeli security barrier and must
not be overlooked. The offense-defense theory helps to provide a powerful understanding
of the Israel security barrier and the complexity surrounding it.
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Chapter III: Security or Separation?
Carl Von Clausewitz, a German military theorist who stressed the moral and
political aspects of war, famously wrote, “War is the continuation of policy by other
means” (War 2000). The separation barrier built in the West Bank during the past decade
undoubtedly serves as part of a war to stop terrorist from infiltrating the Israeli borders.
However, is the war on terror the only war in which the separation fence serves to fight?
In his book Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors Brent L. Sterling writes that
“barriers not only present the least politically painful course of action but they also
remove the incentive to pursue changes that would improve long-term security prospects”
(Sterling 325). This chapter will seek to confirm or deny this theory in the case of the
Israeli security barrier by addressing the notion that the security fence has been built in
order to implement other policies of the Israeli government.
I. “Buying Time”
Brent Sterling’s theory pinpoints an incredibly important topic that surrounds
security barriers. In order to fully understand the implications of this theory in the Israeli
case it is necessary to first examine the idea behind Sterling’s argument. Sterling argues
that strategic defenses cannot completely eliminate an adversarial threat, so decision
makers have always sought to reduce their vulnerability by constructing strategic barriers
that either “buy time” or allow a state to “operate proactively” in a safer environment
(Sterling 324). Although these two ideas make sense, Sterling argues that historical
evidence proves that both of these motivations can entail dangerous long-term
consequences.
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Sterling’s research shows that the far more common circumstance by decision
makers involves states attempting to “buy time” through the construction of a strategic
defense system. Decision makers may seek to “buy time” for contrasting reasons. First,
states may desire an accommodation but lack a viable negotiating partner. For example,
Israel in the late 1960s had to wait for Egyptian president Nasser’s departure from office
before a diplomatic resolution of its disputes with Egypt would be possible (Sterling
125). Second, officials may want to undertake an offensive position against the enemy
but need to build up strength. Yu Zijun in the early 1740s stressed to Ming emperor
Chenghua that the Yansui wall would allow the local area to recover sufficiently to
facilitate the much-desired seizure of the Ordos region (Sterling 124). Finally, leaders
may just aim to “perpetuate defensive security” (Sterling 325). The French army built
the Maginot Line to help protect the northeastern frontier and enable broader security
until such a time arrived that alternative defense measures could be employed (Sterling
218).
Regardless of the reason, barriers provide this breathing space by favorably
shifting the previously mentioned offense-defense balance while simultaneously
establishing a sense of being safe. Such perceptions are critical given that they drive
public and elite attitudes and thus, ultimately, policy choice. Sterling writes, “the
potential for perceptions of security to deviate sharply from reality exists given the likely
significant degree of uncertainty over a state’s true security unless actually involved in a
military engagement” (Sterling 326). Achieving a sense of safety is a vital component of
any political leader’s duty and requires a favorable interpretation of the situation on the
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ground leading officials to stress, if not exaggerate, barrier strength. These “public
relations” campaigns have been a staple of strategic defense efforts (Sterling 325).
The enhanced perception of security produced by the construction of a strategic
defense system, however, tends to undermine the pursuit of a fundamental, longer-lasting
solution to the adversarial relationship. In particular, unpopular political, economic and
military changes are unlikely to occur as the pressure to undertake them is relieved by the
barrier (Seguin 7). The Ming dynasty provides the foremost example. The Great Wall,
even if not providing perfect security, was sufficient to forgo a politically and culturally
unwanted embrace of the concessions necessary for an accommodation with the Mongols
or to adopt the major economic and military reforms necessary to obtain better fighting
capability. Eventually, this would ultimately prove disasters for the Ming dynasty. The
misconception that the Great Wall could prevent full attack caused the Ming dynasty to
become complacent with their armed forces. Although the Mongolians never successfully
broke through the wall, the Manchus did. The Manchus crossed the Great Wall in 1644
and soon after seized Beijing, toppling the Ming Dynasty and establishing the Qing
Dynasty (Sterling 226).
Plato once wrote that “walls…tempt men to relax their guard and to trust to the
false security provided by ramparts and bars” (War 2000). Sterling would argue that
Plato should have added that the passage “of time exacerbates this effect” (Sterling 326).
As a result, the goal of “buying time” with strategic defenses tends to morph into a policy
of “muddling through” that entails increasing danger (Sterling 327). Initially, the barrier
enhances the security of the state, but over time, it can be argued, that security is broken
down and becomes weaker. It can be argued that a highly motivated foe aggressively
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searches for counters to the physical, static structure. Eventually means emerge that,
along with the fortifications deterioration, decrease a strategic defense’s contribution to
security. The longer this search takes without aggression or at least successful attacks,
the stronger the perceptions of security become among decision makers and the broader
public.
According to Sterling, the tendency toward “muddling through” with an
increasing sense of security suggests long-term peril of efforts to “buy time.” However,
rising powers that act more aggressively, feeling liberated by their reduced vulnerability,
have also found danger (Sequin 9). As a result of strategic defense systems, decision
makers are more willing to take positions and actions with great risk in pursuit of further
shifting the power balance in their directions. An example of this is seen through the
Athenian’s behavior during the Second Peloponnesian War. The Athenian’s believed
that they were protected well enough to send out a lightweight force of twenty ships on
an expedition to Sicily. Lasting from 415 BC to 413 BC, this expedition would
ultimately cause a crucial turning point in the Peloponnesian War. Upon arriving in
Sicily, the Athenian force was met with crippling attacks. Eventually, Athens sent two
hundred ships and thousands of soldiers to aid the suffering men who could not fight the
armies in Sicily. This contingency of fighters was mostly lost in a single battle near
Sicily. While this battle took place, Athens enemies on land were encouraged to take
action, breaking through Athens security defense systems and ultimately destroying the
state. Athens false sense of security allowed it to make decisions that would have
bolstered the states power if successful but instead the idea of being completely secure
caused widespread destruction (Sterling 35-37).
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Security defense systems are much more complex than they appear to be. On the
surface, these barriers act as agents of security that protect citizens of one state from
outside forces of an adversary. While these barriers initially serve the purpose of
fulfilling a security niche, overtime the security system creates and dictates other policies.
Whether this is a policy of buying time or a policy of separation, security barriers
influence the actions of a state. To a similar extent, the Israeli security barrier has
evolved. The barrier has now become about borders, not security. The barrier has
effectively prevented Israel from making concessions necessary to find a long-term
sustainable solution with the Palestinian entity. For Israel, finding a long-term solution to
the conflict would result in a better security outcome than any barrier will ever achieve.
Israel has not failed to adapt its military or take new unnecessary risks but it has used the
security barrier to enforce political goals “in the least politically painful way” (Sterling
325).
The Case of the Israeli Security Barrier
The investigation of the above theories relevance to the Israel security barrier will
deal heavily with the discussion of the current route of the barrier. The route of the
fence, as approved by the government, is based primarily on the Israeli Supreme Court
decision in June 2004, which ruled out the route of the fence West of Jerusalem on the
argument that it didn't satisfy the required balance between Israel’s security needs and the
daily needs of the Palestinian population. To fully explore if the Israeli security barrier is
“the least politically painful course of action” for the Israeli government, this section will
first examine public opinion surrounding the barrier and then will dissect different Israeli
political actions that contradict the main security goal of the barrier.

53

I. Public Opinion
Yehuda Ben Meir and Dafna Shaked completed a study in 2007 called The People
Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security. This study examined numerous
issues surrounding Israeli National Security, including the security barrier (Meir 2007).
According to the report, Israeli public opinion has been strongly in favor of the barrier,
partly in the hope that it will improve security and partly in the belief that the barrier
marks the eventual borders of a Palestinian state. According to a Haaretz article
published in 2005, a survey conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research
at Tel Aviv University found that eighty-four percent of the Jewish population of Israel
supports the barrier (Harel 2). Most Israeli’s believe the barrier, and intensive activity by
the IDF, to be the main factors in the decrease of successful suicide attacks from the West
Bank. The proponents of the barrier insist that reversible inconveniences to Palestinians
should be balanced with the threats to the lives of Israeli civilians and point out that the
barriers is a non-violent way to stop terrorism and save innocent lives (Chen 28).
There are some Israelis who oppose the barrier. The settler movement opposes the
barrier, although this opposition has waned since it became clear that the barrier would be
diverted to the east of major Israeli settlements such as Ariel (Arieli 2). Many Israelis
living in settlements, such as Gush Etzion, oppose the fence because it separates them
from the rest of Israel. They argue that building the fence defines a border, and that they
are being left out. According to most settlers, all of the West Bank belongs to Israel and
separating any of it with a fence is the first step in giving the land away.
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Colonel Shaul Arieli, who was the last commander of the Gaza regional brigade
of the IDF, also opposes the barrier because he believes that the effects of the barrier will
only be short-term. He stated,
The fence provides a partial security response to the terror threats and a good
response to prevention of illegal immigration and prevention of criminal
acts…but on the other hand in its current format it creates the future terror
infrastructure because this terror infrastructure is precisely those people living in
enclaves who will support acts of terror as the only possible tool that they
perceive as being able to restore them the land, production sources and water
wells taken from them (Arieli 3).
Arieli also argues that the barrier is designed to induce the Arabs of the border region to
leave so that Israel can expand (Arieli 3).
The barrier has come under large criticism from those who oppose it. On August
17th, 2005 the Israeli Newspaper Haaretz said of the barrier “Sharon has tried in vain to
describe it as ‘only another counterterrorism measure.’ Nevertheless, it looks like a
border and behaves like one, with barbed wire, electronic devices, concrete walls,
watchtowers and checkpoints. Its creation set a crucial precedent in the unilateral
division of the land, which came to fit Sharon perfectly” (Ben 2005). Yossi Klein Halevy,
Israeli correspondent for The New Republic, writes of the barrier that “building over the
green line, by contrast, reminds Palestinians that every time they’ve rejected
compromise—whether in 1937, 1947, or 2000—the potential map of Palestine shrinks…
The fence is a warning: If Palestinians don’t stop terrorism and forfeit their dream of
destroying Israel, Israel may impose its own map on them… and, because Palestine isn’t
being restored but invented, its borders are negotiable” (Halevy 3). This quote by Halevy
demonstrates that the intentions of the security barrier are in actuality aimed at
establishing a de facto border with the main goal of separating Israel from Palestine.
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Regardless of these opponents, the construction of the security fence continues to
enjoy massive support among the Jewish population. Indeed, it is hard to find any issue
in Israel about which these is so wide a consensus: Eighty percent in 2004, eighty-two
percent in 2005, seventy-nine percent in 2006, seventy-six percent in 2007 supported the
construction of the fence (Meir 2007). In the context of a question relating to the various
proposals on the route of the fence, eighty-one percent in 2005, senvety-five percent in
2006, and seventy-eight percent in 2007 disagreed with the statement that “the fence
should not have been constructed at all” (Meir 2007). Respondents were also asked in
under certain circumstances (e.g. no possibility of political progress with the Palestinians
and a resurgence of terrorism in the territories) would they agree that Israel declare the
fence as its permanent border. A clear majority was in favor in 2005 (fifty-seven percent)
and in 2006 (sixty percent) (Meir 2007). However, by 2007 the Jewish population was
evenly split on the issue: forty-nine percent in favor and fifty-one percent opposed (Meir
2007).
An examination of Israeli public opinion surrounding the security barrier
demonstrates the complex situation that is created when building a security system. The
massive support for the fence is primarily interpreted as Israeli preoccupation with
security concerns and with the need to combat terrorism, specifically suicide bombers.
Israel’s initial success in limiting suicide attempts created a sense of complete security
amongst Israeli citizens. This allowed the Israeli government to continue to construct the
fence with public support. However, the findings above support the claim that the Israeli
public understands that the fence now has a deeper, more political meaning. This change
signifies tthat most Israelis have come to realize the answer to the conflict lies in
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separation between Israeli and Palestinians. The above findings demonstrate the paradox
that has been established surrounding this wall. Public opinion reflects the goals of the
state and in this case portrays the understanding that the Israeli government is employing
the security barrier as a tool for the establishment of a final Israeli border. More than
this, Israeli public opinion shows that even with public controversy over the support of
the wall, Israel would rather deal with having citizens who may be against the wall than
work towards peace with Palestine. The above findings allow one to conclude that the
public understands that the barrier was initially built for security purposes but is now
being used for very specific political implications.
II. Political Action
This thesis has shown and proven that the security barrier was initially built as a
response to security threat against the everyday lives of the residents of Israel. The
personal security of Israeli residents and the low price Israel paid during the first two
decades of its control of the territories helped maintain uncertainty regarding the political
future of these territories and allowed Israel to avoid establishing definitive borders. The
first and second intifadas dramatically changed this and gave rise to the idea of physical
separation as part of Israel’s political goal for the territories (Arieli 8). Yitzhak Rabin, as
prime minister, said that he “regards the separation issue as a central topic” (Benn 1995).
Similarly, Ehud Barak saw separation as “a supreme national need of demography,
identity and Israeli democracy. Barak coined the concept of “we are here and they are
there.” In fact, just before Ariel Sharon replaced him as prime minister, Barak stated,
“Ultimately, the only path for Israel is separation from the Palestinians—if possible via
an accord, and if this turn out to be impossible, the via a measured and proportional
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security separation initiative”(Edilist 442). Sharon echoed this sentiment when he stated,
“I believed and hoped that we would be able to hold on forever…but the changing reality
in the country, in the region and in the world, required me to adopt a different assessment
and changes in positions” (Sharon 2005).
The policy regarding the path of the fence is already a complex story. It was
Tsipi Livni, serving as minister or Justice, who expressed this in the clearest way possible
when she said that the separation fence would constitute “the future border of the State of
Israel,” and that “the High Court is drawing the borders of the state via its rulings on the
fence” (Chen 36). Barak too, when serving as minister of defense in the government of
Ehud Olmert, noted that “when we build a fence it is clear that there are areas that are
beyond the fence, and it is clear that in the permanent accord…these areas that are
beyond the fence will not be part of the State of Israel” (Radio 2007). Moreover, Prime
Minister Sharon, the “father of the route,” claimed in regard to the objective of the fence
route “…Palestinians should have understood that what they did not receive today, it
might be impossible to give them tomorrow” (Bakor Nir 2003). He also emphasized that
“the demographic consideration played an important role in determining the route of the
separation fence due to the fear of annexing hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who
would join the Arab of Israel” (Benn 2005). Olmert, Sharon’s successor, could only
reiterate: “The direction is clear, we are moving toward separation from the Palestinians,
toward the demarcation of a permanent border of Israel” (Kham 2006). Through these
quotes it is made clear that the route of the fence thus has political objectives in regard to
permanent borders between the State of Israel and Palestine. Israel’s political goals are
reflected as the annexation of the areas beyond the Green Line where most of the Israeli

58

settlers live, while maintaining the existing demographic proportion between Jews and
non-Jews (Chen 40).
Furthermore, the decision about the route of the fence to cross deep into the
territory of the West Bank came under fire from the international community at large. In
order to defend against these attacks Israel employed the use of the IDF as well as the
High Court of Petitions Department of the State Prosecutors office. According to Israeli
law, only the IDF, which represents all of the government authorities in the occupied
territory, is permitted to violate the basic rights of the Palestinian residents. By defining
the fence “as an essential security need” and by issuing temporary “expropriation orders”
for land required for building the fence the government of Israel was able to justify
building such a wall (Arieli 6). The government sufficed with Sharon’s letter to
President G. Bush in which he declared “…the fence is a security barrier and not a
political one, temporary and not permanent, and thus will not affect the issues of the
permanent accord, including the definition of final borders” (Sharon 2004).
The IDF did not plan the route of the barrier but they did become the party
responsible for construction and monitoring. Moreover, it was the IDFs duty to ensure
that the barrier was being created for security purposes and thus that route of the barrier
reflected this policy. Initially, the IDF maintained this stance and worked to ensure a
strict policy of security (Chen 43). However, the IDF did not remain consistent with this
policy and even forfeited its professional view, which establishes that the IDF cannot act
in the Palestinian territories for political reasons. The Israeli High Court explains this
view in more depth when it states:
In regard to the authority of the military commander to build the security fence in
the area, it was determined in accordance with the laws of belligerent occupation
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that the military commander is entitled to order, based upon military
considerations, the construction of a separation fence in the area of Judea and
Samaria … This authority arises only when the fundamental reason for building
the fence is a security-military one. The military commander is not authorized to
order the construction of a security fence if the reasons for it are political. The
security fence cannot derive from motives of annexing land from the area to the
State of Israel. The objective of the separation fence cannot be the demarcation of
a political border (HCJ 2056/04).
The IDF is solely a military force aimed at securing and protecting its citizens. It may
work to build a security fence if the purpose is strictly security. According to the court,
once the IDF concedes to political motives it is no longer acting under its jurisdiction. In
many cases surrounding the barrier the IDF did in fact fail to uphold its professional
standards and “subordinated to political considerations that are unrelated to security”
(Arieli 7).
More specifically, the IDF was mobilized and politically encouraged to defend the
fence route, which served as a component in the battle to implement a policy that was
essentially political rather than security-based. The IDF even sacrificed security needs
“on the altar of internal political considerations” (Chen 47). For example, Supreme Court
President Beinisch ruled in the Bil'in-Modi'in Ilit case:
It seems that in light of the desire to ensure the construction of the eastern
neighborhood in the future, the fence route was drawn in a place that has no
security advantage. The current route of the fence also raises questions pertaining
to the security advantage it offers. It is clear that the route mainly traverses
territory that is topographically inferior, both vis-à-vis Modi'in Ilit and vis-à-vis
Bil'in. It leaves a number of hills on the Palestinian side and two hills on the
Israeli side. It endangers the forces patrolling along the route. Against the
background of the security outlook presented to us in many other cases, according
to which there is security importance in building the fence in topographically
dominant areas, the existing route raises questions. In general, in many cases of
planning the fence route, the military commander presents the occupation of
dominant hills as a significant security advantage, while in the case before us a
route was drawn that is at least partly located in inferior territory in relation to the
hills (HCJ 8414/05).
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When examining the fence route approved in October 2003, it is evident that the
barrier was planned in a way that would include a maximum of Palestinian lands--without the homes of the landowners (Arieli 8). It is clear that the accumulation of
territory came at the expense of the security. The following declaration can be found on
the Ministry of Defense’s website:
With the goal of enabling agricultural work, maintaining uninterrupted movement
between the villages and cities, and ensuring access to municipal, sanitation and
social services between the villagers and the district city along the fence, many
passages were established for the Palestinians to use. In this framework, 37 gates
have been built so far (out of a total of 53) for the passage of farmers who are
residents of nearby villages, 34 control points…(MOD 2003)
IDF forces are now employed with the task of operating dozens of these agricultural
gates, which allow Palestinians access to their lands that remained beyond the fence. The
state itself argued in affidavits submitted to the High court that “every passage point
increases the danger of infiltration by terrorist into Israel and constitutes a point of
friction that intensifies the risk to the defense forces assigned to the passage point” (HCJ
4289/05). Instead of excluding most of the Palestinian lands from Israel wherever
possible, the state separated the lands from their owners. Therefore, they were forced to
build many gates that constitute a security threat because of increased movement between
Palestine and Israel. This simultaneously tied down the elite forces required to operate
these fences (Arieli 10). Furthermore, this new “friction” created more incentive for
Palestinian’s to defy Israel, essentially motivating the Palestinians to find new ways to
fight against the state or overcome the security barrier.
The IDF also contradicted itself by adopting routes that it had completely rejected
during earlier route planning stages. It can be argued this was done in order to fulfill the
political objective of the route. The most blatant case is that of Ma’alei Adumim (Arieli
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10-11). The southern part of the fence route, first published in February 2005, was
supposed to include both the settlement of Kedar and the caravan site adjacent to it.
During the High Court discussions in this case, state representatives presented
“alternatives” for the fence route that had been created by political officials. The IDF,
who strongly disagreed with these routes, presented a different route that provided the
highest security advantage. An IDF representative described the implications of the
alternative route plan that they initially strongly rejected:
If this alternative were to be implemented, it would be necessary to traverse the
deep and steep riverbed described above. This crossing would constitute a very
problematic route from the operational, security and engineering perspective
because it would create a particularly circuitous route with sharp side slopes and
longitudinal slopes that are borderline in terms of the criteria for planning a patrol
from the security perspective. Part of the route traverses hilly terrain that is also
inferior from an operational perspective. Due to the side slopes, the exposed
crossing and the bisection of the Abu Hindi valley, there would also be very
severe harm to the landscape. In addition, the cost of executing this route would
be particularly high … In light of the above, it was found that from an
engineering, security and operational perspective, this alternative cannot be
accepted (Chen 50).
The High Court, in 2005, did not rule on the case and asked the IDF to resubmit a
proposal.
After a year and a half of delays in submitting a new plan for the route, the IDF
returned with a proposal that completely matched one of the state created “alternatives”
that it had “examined” and rejected in 2005 (Arieli 11). In the state’s written response in
December 2006, backed by a security affidavit from the chief of staff of the Central
Command at the time, an IDF representative addressed the implications of this alternative
and stated that bisecting the Abu Hindi valley that separates Kedar and Ma’alei Adumim
would in fact give the IDF a security advantage in this area (Arieli 11). Without
question, this decision came after major Israeli political figures placed large amounts of
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pressure on the IDF. This case demonstrates the heavy political influence surrounding
the wall. The IDF, which acts as the main security entity for the state of Israel, altered its
expert opinion so that the political goals of land inclusion could be attained.
Moreover, Israel employed security arguments to justify the political fence route
that ended up being completely false. One extreme example of this was the contradiction
between the state’s response to the petition against the fence route in Gush Etzion and the
response to the petitions against the “permits regime” (Chen 52). In the first petition, the
state’s representatives sought to defend the fence route, which enclosed five Palestinian
villages in the area between Gush Etzion and Jerusalem by exempting their 20,000
Palestinian residents, and all others in the West Bank, from the need for entry and exit
permits, because they assumed that the High Court would not allow them to operate the
“permits regime”5 in such a large area and for such a large population. The petition
stated that, “It should be emphasized and declared that the entry of any person to the
Gush Etzion area will not be prevented (even people who have security restrictions),
subject to a security check. This entry will not require an entry permit […],” the state
promised (Arieli 12).
Less than four months later, the attorneys already wrote the opposite when
instructing the IDF:
There is a rational and direct connection between closing the territory of the seam
zone and establishing a permits regime, on the one hand, and the security need, on
the other hand. Restricting entry only to those who have a real personal
connection to this area and making this entry conditional on receiving a permit
that requires an individual security check, very significantly limits the possibility
of terrorists crossing the security fence and subsequently entering Israel to carry
out attacks (HCJ 639/04).
5

The permits regime required a Palestinian who wished to enter or stay in the seam zone (the area
between the fence and the Green Line) to present a permit from the Civil Administration based on
proof that he is a resident of the place or owns land or a business in the seam zone.
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In the first petition, the attorneys attacked the proposal by the Council for Peace and
Security, which proposed an alternative fence route. The state’s representatives argued
that “the Palestinians who cultivate the fields in these lands would be forced in practice to
transition to a permits regime. It is clear that this entails a drastic change for the worse in
the daily lives of these residents” (HCJ 639/04). In the second petition,,the permits
regime does not in fact cause a “drastic change for the worse.” According to the petition,
the great benefit in closing the territory, while establishing a permits regime in parallel, is
proportional in regard to the difficulties that are caused to the local residents. In the first
petition, the defense establishment showed generosity and announced, “goods from the
east and the south of the fence” could move into the Gush Etzion. And in the second
petition, it explained why this exact same thing, as requested by the petitioners, could not
be implemented (HCJ 639/04). Although the second petition may seem security based in
nature it does in fact represent a transition from concern with security to a concern with
Palestinian gains. While the first petition gives Palestinian’s some freedom, the second
petition removes these freedoms by claiming that the security of the state is at risk. In
actuality, the Israeli government is attempting to politically limit the abilities of the
Palestinians to move [freely] into Israel.
Through speeches, court cases, and petitions, it has become extremely clear that
the barrier is about much more than security. There is a large amount of political
complexity surrounding the construction of this barrier. Israeli politicians, army
personnel and state-sponsored lawyers have all openly admitted that this barrier
represents a separation from those on the other side. The information above provides
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concrete evidence to support the fact that Israel has established a powerful political
barrier.
Conclusion
“…Barriers not only present the least politically painful course of action but they
also remove the incentive to pursue changes that would improve long-term security
prospects” (Sterling 325). Statistics dictate that the security barrier is in fact making
Israeli citizens safer. The decline in terrorist attacks over the last ten years is astonishing
as there have been close to zero successful attacks within the state since the completion
of large parts of the wall. However, is the Israeli security barrier only about security?
The above information directs the answer, undoubtedly, to be no. According to
both Israeli public opinion and an examination of Israeli political action since the creation
of the barrier, it seems that the Israeli political system has used the security “excuse” to
essentially cover up for other motives behind the wall. Besides security, the barrier seems
to be acting as the “least politically painful course of action” for the Israeli government.
Instead of politically separating themselves from the West Bank through comprehensive
negotiations, Israeli policy makers have chosen to hide behind what some argue is a
“separation wall.” The information above makes it clear that the barrier has much deeper
political meaning, which includes the possibility of the barrier acting as a final border for
the Israeli state. Moreover, the barrier is removing any and all possibilities of an
improvement of “long term security prospects.” The only way to ensure the citizens of
Israel are completely safe is to come to a peace arrangement with the Palestinians. The
Palestinian governing entity has made it extremely clear that the barrier must not
continue to be erected if the Israeli’s wish to come to a peace agreement. Construction of
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the barrier has stifled any negotiations for peace, especially dealing with a conversation
about a two-state solution, making “long term security prospects” an unattainable goal.
The security barrier has been established by the Israeli government as a failing substitute
for comprehensive bilateral agreements between Israel and Palestine as well as the
establishment of a peace treaty between the two entities. The ability of the Israeli
government to remove the possibility of normal relations will inevitably have
consequences for both Israel and Palestine. Palestinians, who see the wall as unjust and
illegal, will continue to struggle as they are cut off from the rest of the world. More
importantly, frustrated Palestinians may indeed turn to violence as a solution to their
problems. Palestinians will look for ways to bypass the barrier and use terror and
violence when they arrive on the other side. In fact, the very barrier that was constructed
to stop violence against the state of Israel may actually increase it. The state of Israel
has masked their political goals behind a security barrier that stands for much more then
it may seem. It is clearly apparent that the “security” barrier is becoming less about
security and more about “separation.” As the wall approaches the final construction
stages, the political goals of the barrier are becoming more and more clear. Whether the
end result is the “least politically painful course” or the removal of “the incentive to
pursue changes that would improve long-term security prospects”, Israel has been
successful in creating a barrier that not only accomplishes its goal of security but also
enforces irreversible Israeli political decisions.
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Conclusion
The Israeli Security Barrier pops up out of nowhere. I know this because I’ve
been there. In 2010, while studying in Israel for 6 months, I had the opportunity to spend
two days learning about the security barrier first hand. On the Israeli side, I spoke with
the family of victims of terrorist attacks who emotionally described how they wish the
barrier had been constructed sooner. On the Palestinian side, in the West Bank, I spoke
with barrier protestors who painfully described how much the wall has changed their
lives. I walked along the wall on both sides. I felt the concrete that separated two sides
of the most complex conflict in our world today. I dissected the powerful graffiti drawn
by artists, supporters and opponents. I watched the Israeli-Defense Force patrol and
enforce its new security policy. I learned about the barrier in a way that no book or article
could teach. This experience was the beginning of an investigation that has provided a
greater understanding of the issues surrounding the Israel security barrier. From the
research done for this paper, I have drawn several conclusions.
I. Suicide Terror
Almost all of the current commentary on the Israeli security barrier mentions or
focuses on the phenomenon that the barrier was Israel’s response to a rise in suicide
terror. The Israeli government has confirmed and supported this to defend itself against
attacks from the international community. In actuality, the barrier has done an incredibly
impressive job at removing the threat of suicide terror to Israeli citizens. It is necessary
to reiterate that since construction of the wall commenced terrorist activities within the
state of Israel have completely ceased. The Israeli Defense Force has worked effectively
to utilize the barrier as a terrorist stopping entity. By limiting access to the country,
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increasing patrols and stepping up security, the government of Israel has successfully
accomplished its goal.
Removing the threat of suicide terror has been one of the greatest successes for
the Israeli government throughout the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All governments
throughout the world have the responsibility to keep their citizens safe. Israel realized
that their citizens were in danger everyday and did something to protect them. It is hard
to critique Israel for creating a security structure with the goal of protecting human life.
There is large support, as there should be, for the barrier as a true security tool. I strongly
agree with the choice by Israel to establish this barrier to stifle terrorism. In this regard,
Israel has acted properly and is just in its actions to construct the wall.
II. Offense-Defense
The Offense-Defense theory discussed in Chapter II is something that must be
paid large attention to in the next few years of the barriers existence. My conclusions in
Chapter II stated that the barrier does not currently provide an offensive or defensive
stance. In fact, the Israeli government has used the security barrier to accomplish both
offensive and defensive goals. This equilibrium between offense and defense has allowed
the balance to remain even. Although this status quo has been the case thus far for the
security barrier, it is extremely necessary for the international community to continue to
focus on the offense-defense balance surrounding the barrier. Keeping a close
examination on the balance will ultimately allow the international community to get a
advantageous understanding of Israeli intentions. Offense and defense intentions will be
made clear by the Israeli government through their actions regarding the wall. If Israel
mobilizes more armed personnel to the barrier as well as places more advanced weaponry
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along the route, offensive intentions may be concluded. If Israel creates tighter border
controls and further limits the flow of people across its borders, defensive intentions may
be concluded. There been little attention paid to the offense-defense phenomenon in the
case of the Israeli security barrier but the research in this paper provides support for the
importance of focusing on this balance in the future. I would argue that the offensedefense balance must be given more attention as it evolves into a greater part of this
conflict. Furthermore, I would also argue that the Israeli government should only take
defensive actions vis a vis the wall. Offensive actions will not help the Israeli
government make any gains in the peace negotiations nor in their mission to create a
stable environment in the Middle East.
III. Not a Temporary Barrier
A few years ago many people believed that this barrier was a temporary fix for
the conflict between Israeli’s and Palestinians. The wall would be built until a more
definite solution could be reached. The research done for this paper has shown that this
wall is by no means temporary. The Israeli government is spending millions of dollars to
construct this wall and is literally cementing it in to place. The confirmation that the
barrier is not temporary will have enormous effects on the conflict.
As the barrier continues to cause social and economic hardships on the Palestinian
citizens, more and more unrest will begin to occur. The Palestinians will continue to
come to terms with the idea that they are essentially trapped in an enclosed area with no
way out. This may cause further frustrations in the West Bank leading to heightened
violence and resistance against the Israeli power.
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The permanent barrier will also pose new challenges to Israel in the future. The
barrier, and the upkeep necessary for it to remain a powerful security tool, will place
large strains on Israel’s economy. Since the beginning of construction the cost of the
barrier has ballooned from $1billion USD to $2.1 billion USD. It is estimated that every
kilometer of the barrier costs $2 million USDs to construct. Israel must prepare itself to
make increased economic investments in to the barrier if they want it to continue to be
effective. The interesting piece here is whether or not the cost of up keeping a permanent
barrier will outweigh the positive gains the wall is making. In my opinion, the wall will
become an enormously large economic burden for the Israeli government, which will
cause a decrease in support for the wall. As the appearance of suicide terror decreases,
Israeli society may no longer favor a security system that costs more then it is actually
worth. Furthermore, as Palestinian terrorists develop new ways to circumvent the barrier,
the Israeli government will be faced with new costs that include strengthening the
security system. Solidifying this barrier as a permanent part of the Israeli security system
is absolutely going to create major issues for the Israeli government and will remain an
important fixture in the conflict between security and border control.
IV. Political Motives
Chapter III of this paper focused on the other political motives behind the creation
of the security barrier. I confirmed in that chapter that the wall is intertwined with
numerous Israeli policies that range from border definition to demographic balancing.
The enforcement of political goals via the wall is something that should not astonish
people. Countries often use actions camouflaged by broad policy statements to
accomplish more sensitive political goals. Israel is no different. However, I believe that
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the sensitivity of the conflict between Israel and Palestine has caused Israel to come
under large scrutiny and criticism from the international community. Israel must combat
this by coming to terms with the exact purpose of the barrier. As Israel continues to
neglect international judicial rulings as well as recommendations from allies, it will
constantly have a difficult time justifying the reasons for the barriers existence. Israel
must establish more transparency with the international community and present viable
and credible reasons for continuing to construct and support the barrier.
V. The Future
Historically, walls created by state entities have always been destroyed. The
Athens Long Walls were destroyed in 404 BC as part of a peace treaty after the
Peloponnesian War. The Long Walls were dismantled only to be rebuilt and than
dismantled again by the Macedonians in 323 BC (Sterling 52).
Hadrian’s Wall fell after the emperor died. The new emperor, who replaced
Hadrian, abandoned the wall leaving it to crumble. Eventually, in the late 4th century, the
Romans lost control of Britain and the walls were left to become the remains of an
empire that once stood strong (Sterling 89.)
Today, much of the Great Wall of China still stands. However, the Wall became
obsolete as a defense system when China’s borders extended beyond the Wall and the
threatening Mongolians were annexed into the country. Due to this phenomenon,
construction and repair were discontinued (Sterling 142).
The Maginot Line became extinct after World War II. The rise of the French
independent nuclear weapons system coupled with new advancement in technology
caused the Line to become an unnecessary expense that the government could no longer
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afford. The ultimate result for all of these defense structures was destruction (Sterling
238). Whether this destruction was caused by political motives, economic weakness or
physical actions, these walls have typically served to fill only a short-term security goal.
Will the Israeli security barrier serve the same destiny?
Most information will confirm that the Israeli security barrier is going to remain a
piece of the Israeli landscape for many years to come. Although economic burden, which
was mentioned above, is a factor in the future of the barrier, Israel has a strong economy
that has always been committed to spending on security. Unlike security defense systems
in the past, the barrier will undoubtedly be supported by the Israeli economy as it
continues to secure the state. Moreover, the Israeli barrier does not face a major threat
from a militarized state. Hadrian’s Wall, the Great Wall of China and the Athens Long
Walls all fell because they were either destroyed by a powerful threat or were no longer
needed to protect against that threat. The Palestinian entity does not have the ability to
attack the barrier in a manner that would cripple it. Small weapons and arms are no real
match for the power of the Israeli Defense Force and the wall poses too great an obstacle
for the current Palestinian abilities.
With the removal of economic and military threats, it can be concluded that the
only way the barrier will fall is via politics. The downfall of previous security walls
throughout history has been a result of militarized action, economic failure or neglect. If
the Israeli security barrier were to fall because of the influence of politics it would be
extremely historic. In my opinion, domestic Israeli politics will not be the catalyst for the
tearing down of the Israeli security barrier. Instead, international politics and a push for
an Israel-Palestinian peace solution by outside forces will be the ultimate reason for a
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destruction of the barrier. It is obvious that the barrier has forever changed the nature of
the conflict. If Israel ever wishes to come to an agreement with the Palestinian Authority
they must first come to a solution about the existence of the barrier. The Palestinian
Authority has claimed numerous times that it will not negotiate with the Israeli
government if the barrier continues to exist and the settlement issue is not dealt with. The
Israeli government has clearly shown that it will not take down the barrier nor will it
freeze or remove settlements. This stalemate is currently one of the main reasons behind
the halt in negotiations between the two sides.
The only solution to re-energize the non-existent conversation between the two
sides must come from the international community. International action by powerful
actors like the United States will be the only way a possible, agreed upon, and feasible
solution can be developed. However, this too seems to be a very distant goal with no real
chance of ever becoming reality. Studying the Israeli security barrier has shown that the
world, as a whole, is currently in a border securing phase. In fact, the United States has
too been working on constructing an extremely technologically advance barrier between
the U.S. and Mexico border. This fence has been designed to limit the amount of illegal
immigrants and drugs flowing into the United States. Other countries, too, are working
on tighter border controls to combat security issues like terrorism. These security
measures represent a large global change. Globalization once allowed borders to
disappear, making free movement across countries a very common event. Now, with the
appearance of new security threats, countries are beginning to combat globalization with
security structures along their borders. The international community, and specifically the
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Untied States, will have a hard time placing pressure on Israel to take down its barrier
when these countries are building up their own borders.
Israel’s security fence is here to stay. The overall effect the barrier has on the
security of the nation coupled with the lack of detrimental reasons for the Israeli’s to
remove the barrier will allow the structure to remain in place for an indefinite amount of
time. Unfortunately, the existence of the wall does not leave room for much hope for
peace between the Israeli’s and Palestinians. In fact, I believe that as long as the wall
exists, so too will the conflict. There is no possible way for the two entities to come to a
peace agreement while one side, the Israeli’s, continue to construct and support a
structure that has violated human rights as well as disobeyed international rulings. There
is also no way possible for peace to be reached if the other side, the Palestinians, continue
to attack the Israeli citizens with suicide and other forms of terror. Both sides must come
to realize that they are committing acts that are counterproductive to a peace goal. If this
does not happen, peace will never occur.
One day, traveling between the West Bank and Jerusalem may only involve
presenting passport credentials. For now, a maze of border crossings, credential checks
and struggles is reality. The Israeli security barrier is a concrete reminder of the climate
in the Middle East. The security barrier will remain between the West Bank and
Jerusalem, between peace and conflict. In a place of extreme beauty and religious power,
stands a modern day reminder of the complexity of our world. The monstrous concrete
walls, the barbed wire, the constant patrols, and the conflict that surrounds it all provides
a powerful examination of the complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the
major issues facing the world today.
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